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Abstract: In his paper, "Derrida's Deconstruction and the Rhetoric of Proper Genres in Leonardo 
and Lessing," Shun-liang Chao draws on Derrida's discourse of logocentrism to illuminate the "ex-
orbitant" threads of metaphysical thought in Leonardo's and Lessing's texts on the comparison of 
poetry and painting. Both Leonardo and Lessing seek to subordinate one of the two sister arts to 
the other by constructing, respectively, the first, fixed principle of the proper genre and by draw-
ing rigid borders between what is proper and what is improper. Leonardo privileges painting over 
poetry owing to the power of visiblity; on the other hand, Lessing subordinates painting to poetry 
since the former frustrates vision and thus allows the free play of the imagination. In so doing, 
however, they both push their metaphysical arguments into an aporia and as such, that which is 
proper and decidable turns out to be improper and undecidable. 
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Derrida's Deconstruction and the Rhetoric of Proper Genres in Leonardo and Lessing 
 
In Of Grammatology, Jacques Derrida employs the word "exorbitant" to describe his deconstruc-
tive reading of Rousseau. By "exorbitant," Derrida means that the tasks of reading are to leave the 
orbit of the author's (binary) thinking to open a reading and, furthermore, to lay bare the author's 
derailed arguments to which she/he is blind, those that run off the rails of the logic she/he builds: 
"to make the not-seen accessible to sight" (163). The "not-seen," according to Derrida, is a blind 
spot "that opens and limits visibility" (163) in the text. The author desires to, in Derrida's words, 
"arrest," "domesticate," "tame" (157) his/her binarism; but there is always something "exorbitant" 
in his/her text -- something that runs off the rails of his/her logic. We find the image of "exorbi-
tant" in words such as "eccentric," "abnormal," "aberrant," "monstrous," "erring," "trespassing," 
"outrageous," "excessive," and "encroaching" (see the Oxford English Dictionary). It would not be 
exorbitant to say that the notion of "exorbitant" is the matrix of Derrida's deconstruction, that 
which renders the decidable undecidable, the possible impossible, the proper improper. The "exor-
bitant" provokes disorder in the structure and thus allows "the play of the structure" (Writing and 
Difference 278). The "exorbitant" always arrives with conceptual oppositions, escorted by value 
judgment. As Derrida critiques Kant's use of the ergon-parergon opposition as the basis for aes-
thetic judgment: "the whole analytic of [Kant's] aesthetic judgment forever assumes that one can 
distinguish rigorously between the intrinsic and the extrinsic. Aesthetic judgment must properly 
bear upon intrinsic beauty, not on finery and surrounds. Hence one must know -- this is a funda-
mental presupposition, presupposing what is fundamental -- how to determine the intrinsic -- what 
is framed -- and know what one is excluding as frame and outside the frame. We are thus already 
at the unlocatable center of the problem" (The Truth in Painting 63). The intrinsic-extrinsic or in-
side-outside limit is bound up with the concept of an exclusive right, the right of ownership, name-
ly, property. And the idea of property ("an exclusive attribute," "the quality of being proper or 
suitable" [Oxford English Dictionary]) lies at the very core of the law of genre: "As soon as the 
word 'genre' is sounded, as soon as it is heard, as soon as one attempts to conceive it, a limit is 
drawn. And when a limit is established, norms and interdictions are not far behind. ... Thus, as 
soon as genre announces itself, one must respect a norm, one must not cross a line of demarca-
tion, one must not risk impurity, anomaly, or monstrosity" ("The Law of Genre" 56-57). To put it 
further, the law of genre -- the property of a genre -- already implies within itself the anomalous, 
the "exorbitant" from the outset: One never knows what is proper until one knows what is more 
than proper (i.e., exorbitant); that is, they generate each other. This is why Derrida says else-
where: "the proper names are already no longer proper names, because their production is their 
obliteration" (Of Grammatology 109).  
The notion of genre is crucial for working in the comparative mode including interart discourse, 
in that the comparison of arts becomes impossible or insignificant without the existence of the lim-
its that are drawn by different artistic genres. Interart discourse in the history of Western aesthet-
ics can be traced back to the Greek lyric poet Simonides of Ceos, whose catch phrase was record-
ed and made popular by Plutarch as "poema pictura loquens, pictura poema silens" ("poetry is a 
speaking picture, painting a silent poem"). Since then, the comparison, or really, the contest, of 
poetry and painting (broadly, word and image) has occupied the centrepiece of interart criticism -- 
mainly because, as W.J.T. Mitchell has put it, "they are not merely different kinds of creatures, but 
opposite kinds" (Iconology 47). Critics compare verbal and visual arts hardly without referring to 
the following two monographs on the poetry-painting distinction: Leonardo da Vinci's "Paragon: Of 
Poetry and Painting" (ca. 1482) and G.E. Lessing's Laokoön: An Essay on the Limits of Poetry and 
Painting (1766). They both establish the property of poetry and of painting: Leonardo sees eye 
and ear as exclusive to painting and poetry respectively; Lessing considers time as proper to poet-
ry and space as proper to painting. More importantly, they both privilege one over the other by 
constructing a rhetoric of the proper/legitimate/orthodox genre: Leonardo subordinates poetry to 
painting and Lessing painting to poetry. Much of the discourse on the comparison of poetry and 
Shun-liang Chao, "Derrida's Deconstruction and the Rhetoric of Proper Genres in Leonardo and Lessing"         page 3 of 8 
CLCWeb: Comparative Literature and Culture 8.3 (2006): <http://docs.lib.purdue.edu/clcweb/vol8/iss3/1> 
 
painting has served as either an apology for or a stigmatization of the poetry-painting antithesis. 
With this in mind, I intend neither to suture together nor to split apart poetry and painting as 
many critics and scholars do. Instead, inspired by Mitchell's close readings of several important 
texts on the word-image difference, I aim to do Derridean readings of Leonardo's and Lessing's 
texts to debunk the "exorbitant" (in every sense of the word) in their value judgments, thereby 
making the proper improper, the decidable undecidable. It should be mentioned that while Mitchell 
concentrates on the relation of the war between word and image to political ideologies and histori-
cal milieus, I am more interested in unveiling the ways in which Leonardo and Lessing construct 
proper genres with recourse to fixed principles or metaphysical thinking that nevertheless can be 
(partly) undermined.  
The edifice of Western metaphysics since Plato, according to Derrida, has been grounded in 
logocentrism: the assignment of truth or value to the logos (speech, word, presence, reason), 
from whence stems "the debasement of writing, and its repression outside 'full' speech" (Of 
Grammatology 3). The logic of logocentrism, he continues, is in fact that of dichotomy: speech and 
writing, origin and derivation, truth and falsehood; the first terms are superior to the second ones. 
For example, Aristotle says in On Interpretation: "spoken words are the [primary] symbols of 
mental experience and written words are the symbols of spoken words" (qtd. in Of Grammatology 
11); Rousseau once stated: "Writing is nothing but the representation of speech; it is bizarre that 
one gives more care to the determining of the image than to the object" (qtd. in Of Grammatology 
36). In a similar vein, Fernand de Saussure echoes Rousseau: "Language and writing are two dis-
tinct systems of signs; the second exists for the sole purpose of representing the first" (qtd. in Of 
Grammatology 30). In such logocentric arguments, Derrida points out, speech or phonè is always 
valorised, in that it is the primary symbol of mental experience: phonè or voice is "indissolubly to 
the mind or to the thought of the signified sense, indeed to the thing itself" (Of Grammatology 
11). In other words, written words are always derivative and secondary; speech is (the presenta-
tion of) the signifed and writing is (the re-presentation of) the signifier. Speech or voice immedi-
ately presents thought; it is the interiority of mind, thought, meaning, "the self-presence of the 
cognito" (Of Grammatology 12). Voice is an indication of the living conscious, is breath or life it-
self. As Rousseau states in his Essay on the Origin of Languages: "Painting is often dead and inan-
imate. It can carry you to the depths of the desert; but as soon as vocal signs strike your ear, they 
announce to you a being like yourself. They are, so to speak, the voice of the soul. ... And one 
cannot hear either singing or a symphony without immediately acknowledging the presence of an-
other intelligent being" (63-64). Incidentally, one can trace the idea of the voice-presence back to 
the genesis of human life in the Bible: "And they heard the voice of the LORD God walking in the 
garden in the cool of the day: and Adam and his wife hid themselves from the presence of the 
LORD God amongst the trees of the garden" (Genesis: 3:8;The Bible 3). In contrast to speech, 
writing is the mediation of (mediation of) mind, the original thought, is impotent to claim its self-
presence and hence suspicious: "[books]," as Socrates says in the Protagoras, "cannot either an-
swer or ask a question on their own account" (qtd. in Dissemination 136). In the history of West-
ern metaphysics, Derrida observes, the difference between speech and writing is also linked to the 
one between good and bad writing: "the good and natural is the divine inscription in the heart and 
soul; the perverse and artful is technique, exiled in the exteriority of the body" (Of Grammatology 
17). Representative of this argument is Rousseau, who remarks in Emile: "It was as if nature had 
spread out all her magnificence in front of our eyes to offer its text for our consideration. ... I have 
therefore closed all the books. Only one is open to all eyes. It is the book of Nature. In this great 
and sublime book I learn to serve and adore its author" (qtd. in Of Grammatology 18). We there-
fore have a set of binary oppositions: writings of nature and culture, of soul and body, of the inte-
rior and the exterior, of the divine and the mundane, of the infinite and the finite, of presence and 
absence. As a matter of fact, their original model is the Platonic opposition between the intelligible 
and the sensible: in order to solve the problem of the line between reality and appearance, Socra-
tes in the Republic divides the world into "the intelligible realm" and "the visible realm," "the origi-
nal" and "the image," "truth" and "lack of truth," and prefers the former to the latter (509d-510a, 
237-38). In Derrida, (de)construction starts with the priority of the one over the other.  
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Leonardo da Vinci, in "Paragon," repeats Platonic oppositions by referring to another model of 
presence: that which Derrida calls the "presence of the thing to the sight as eidos" (Of Gramma-
tology 12). First, painting, in Leonardo's eyes, is the presence of Nature: painting is "the legitimate 
daughter of nature" and "related to God" (5); by contrast, poetry is the "derivative shadow" of 
painting (14). In other words, poetry is illegitimate / improper / exorbitant, insofar as it is distant 
from God, the original truth. Here painting bears a close parallel to the work of a carpenter in Pla-
to's renowned example of bed-making: God is the "progenitor" of the real bed, the Form (eidos) of 
the bed; a carpenter is its "manufacturer" or, to use Derrida's terms, "demiurge"; and a painter or 
a poet is merely an imitator of a carpenter's particular bed (Plato 597d-e, 347-48; Derrida, Dis-
semination 138). Painting and poetry are thus twice removed from the truth. In the hands of Leo-
nardo, however, painting becomes the presentation or "legitimate" manufacture of God's ideas: 
"And when a picture is unveiled, a great multitude assembles there and the people immediately 
throw themselves upon the ground adoring and praying to Him who the painting depicts and pray-
ing for the turn of health and for eternal salvation, just as though the living divinity were actually 
present ... it is the painted image that causes them, something which all the writings about the 
subject could not do but which the image can accomplish by representing the appearance and the 
power of Deity. Therefore it appears that God loves painting and loves him who loves and cherish-
es it" (10). In opposition to (the apotheosis of) painting, poetry, because of its failure to create an 
appearance, still remains far removed from the truth, impotent to claim its self-presence, and thus 
devalued. In Leonardo, the painting-poetry disanalogy is paralleled with the presence-absence, 
life-death differential: "Now you, poet, describe a beauty without describing anything alive" (22). 
Apparently, here truth and presence or life in the form of visiblity cannot be separated. Second, 
Leonardo goes on to solidify this metaphysical thinking by associating the painting-poetry diversity 
with the concept of "the book of Nature": "The works of nature are of much more value than are 
words, which are works of man, because there is the same relation between the works of men and 
those of nature that there is between man and God. Hence, it is more valuable to copy objects of 
nature and effect true likenesses, than to copy with words the deeds and works of men" (20). Po-
ems, or "the works of men," are mundane and less valuable because words are not able to "effect 
true likenesses." By contrast, paintings, "the legitimate daughter of nature," are divine, in that 
painted images have the power of visibility, of true re-presentation: Paintings, as "the mother of 
perspective" (4), "alone can portray faithfully all the visible works of nature" (5); "Lover, what po-
et can put before you in words the true image of your adored one with as much truth as the paint-
er?" (13) Leonardo's view of painting as faithful re-presentation, "true likenesses," of visible ob-
jects is typical of what Mitchell in Iconology terms "the tyranny of the picture," aided by the inven-
tion of perspective: "[perspective] denies its own artificiality and lays claims to being a 'natural' 
representation of 'the way things look,' 'the way we see,' or ... 'the way things really are'" (37). By 
defining painting as the mother of perspective, Leonardo aims to verify painting as a "true sci-
ence," that which is "capable of mathematical demonstration" (3). He therefore takes one step 
further his precursor Cennino Cennini's claim that painting "deserve[s] to be placed in the rank 
next to science, and to be crowned by Poetry" (4-5; see also Farago 126). In fact, Leonardo, as we 
see here, goes so far as to make painting the dominant art: Since being able to re-present the way 
things really are, painting, he highlights, "does not have need of interpreters for different lan-
guages as does literature and at once satisfies mankind, no differently than do things produced by 
nature" (9); painting, so to say, is "a universal language" (Farago 125), a transcendental signified. 
Third, in order to justify the power of visibility or true re-presentation, Leonardo appeals to the 
judgment of King Mathias, a story redolent of that of King Thamus, the father of speech, who de-
nounces, in Plato's Phaedrus, the pharmakon of writing as pernicious to memory and true 
knowledge (see Derrida, Dissemination 102). Here is King Mathias's judgment: "On the birthday of 
King Mathias a poet brought him a work that he had written in honor of the day, declaring that the 
king was born to benefit the world. A painter presented him with a portrait of his beloved. The king 
hastily closed the poet's book, turned to the painting, and fixed his gaze upon it with great admira-
tion. The poet, then, with much indignation said: 'O King, read, read, and you will find something 
of greater substance than a mute picture.' The king, hearing himself reproached for gazing at mute 
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things, said: "Poet, be still, for you do not know what you are saying. This painting serves a better 
sense than does your work, which is blind for men. Give me something that I can see and touch, 
and not only hear. ... For this reason I judge that your creation is much inferior to that of the 
painter. ... I judge there is nothing on earth made by man that could please me more" (15-16). 
Leonardo, through the mouth of the King, not merely subordinates poetry to painting according to 
visibility or "the presence of the thing to sight," but defines their generic differences by the organs 
to which they appeal -- the eye and the ear.  
He then goes so far as to maintain that "sight is superior to all the other senses" (26), because 
"the work which our hands do at the command of our eyes are infinite" (23); because "the [poetic] 
imagination does not see as well as does the eye" (13); because "facts are subject to the eye" 
(12); and because "sight is less deceived than any other sense" (6). Leonardo continues: "those 
sciences are vain and full of errors which are not born of experience, mother of all certainty, and 
which do not end in recorded experience, that is, where the origin, or middle, or end is not made 
known to the five senses" (11) -- among which the eye is most dependable because, as we have 
seen, "facts are subject to the eye," "sight is less deceived than any other sense." Here the "exor-
bitant" in Leonardo's text becomes accessible to sight. Leonardo pushes his "visuocentric" argu-
ments into an aporia -- a point of undecidability -- when stressing the potency of image over 
word: "Are there not paintings to be seen so like the object that they represent that they have de-
ceived men and animals?" (20) An example is given: "It once happened that I made a picture rep-
resenting a divine subject, and it was bought by a man who fell in love with her. He wished to re-
move the emblems of divinity in order to be able to kiss the picture without scruples. But finally 
conscience overcame his sighs of desire and he was obliged to remove the painting from his 
house" (22). The power of sight/painting, a "true science," to which "facts" are subject, turns out 
to provoke deception, illusion, and irrationality. The power of sight/painting, of "true likenesses," is 
then quite "exorbitant," in every sense of the word. Leornardo regards "true likeness" or visibility 
as the primacy of the proper genre, and thus maintains that "the [poetic] imagination does not see 
as well as does the eye" (13). On the contrary, Lessing reverses Leonardo's value system and 
holds that the free play of the imagination is the first principle of the proper genre. The power, the 
vividness of painted images, in Lessing's eyes, is exorbitant, violent to the imagination; it moti-
vates Lessing to censure painting, to subordinate painting to poetry, for the eye shackles the im-
agination and shrinks pleasure: "to present the uttermost to the eye is to bind the wings of Fancy" 
(17); "what pleases us in a work of art pleases not the eye, but the imagination through the eye" 
(43). Lessing, following the ancients, deems beauty the first and last object of the imitative arts; 
beauty is born of the imagination and gives birth to pleasure. The liberty of the imagination then 
becomes the criterion for judging art. Poetry is superior to painting, in the sense that "poetry has 
the wider sphere [of the imagination], that beauties are within her reach which painting can never 
attain, and that she may often see reason to prefer unpicturesque beauties to picturesque ones" 
(55). Mention should be made briefly of the fact that, in the eighteenth century, Lessing was not 
alone in granting poetry the dominant role due to the freedom of the imagination: Edmund Burke 
in the Inquiry (1756) favours poetry over painting in terms that the former, owing to its obscure or 
unpicturesque nature, is able to arouse the effect of the unbound which is central to the sublime 
(57-59).  
Although Lessing, as Beate Allert argues, liberates poetry from subordination to painting in the 
tradition of ut pictura poesis and of mimesis (113), it is fair to say that he echoes the Platonic ges-
ture by referring to the priority of the unpicturesque over the picturesque, the invisible/intelligible 
over the visible: "This invisibility leaves the imagination free play to enlarge the scene at will. ... 
But painting must accept a visible theatre" (78). In the case of painting, Lessing urges painters of 
his day to quit "expression" as their first law, for the law of beauty, in that the former sacrifices 
imagination to visibility. The effect of the beautiful is engendered by invisibility, i.e., that which is 
unexpressed and left to be imagined in the mind. Painting, he says emphatically, is made "not 
simply to be looked at, but to be contemplated long and often" (16). To achieve this effect, paint-
ers ought to choose the most fruitful, pregnant moment of any action to shun the visible fullness, 
especially "what is unsightly in nature" (16), and as such allow "the free play to the imagination" 
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(16-17) to fill in those moments unpainted. In consequence, Lessing further suggests that the 
painter, since confined by the tangibility of the visual medium, take poetical descriptions as their 
models. For "nothing obliges the poet to concentrate his picture into a single moment," and thus 
"the whole infinite realm of perfection lies open for his imitation" (20-21); also, the poet "has at 
his command whole classes of subjects which elude the artist" (89). Now that "the whole infinite 
realm of perfection" is exclusive to poetry, a wise painter, Lessing warns, would rather copy from 
poetical descriptions than crave "something new and strange," in order to make his painting "uni-
versally intelligible" (76). From this point, he draws a conclusion that "invention" is proper to the 
poet and "execution" to the painter: In painting "the difficulty appears to lie more in the execution 
than in the invention, while with poetry the contrary is the case" (72). In order to excuse the 
painter from the merit of invention, he emphasizes that the painter "deserves more credit" (72) 
who copies nature through the poet's imitation rather than directly from nature: "The painter who 
makes a beautiful landscape from the description of a Thomson, does more than one who takes his 
picture at first hand from nature. The latter sees his model from him; the former must, by an ef-
fort of imagination, think he sees it. One makes a beautiful picture from vivid, sensible impression, 
the other from the feeble, uncertain representations of arbitrary signs" (73). Here Lessing intro-
duces disorder into his "verbocentric" arguments. It is tempting to say that the assignment of "ex-
ecution" to painting is not established on a rigorous basis, but rather on the consumption of la-
bour: for the painter, it is more laborious and hence more creditable and proper to picture from 
"the feeble, uncertain representations of arbitrary signs" than to copy directly from visible objects.  
The thread of the consumption of labour is exposed to sight as well when Lessing defines and 
confines the "proper sphere" (x) of poetry and of painting according to the "first principles" -- 
namely, space and time. Painting belongs to the spatial arts, in that "its signs or means of imita-
tion can be combined only in space" (90); as such, its primary subjects are "bodies with their visi-
ble properties," i.e., objects existing side by side in space. On the contrary, poetry belongs to the 
temporal arts, because its signs "can express only objects which succeed each other ... in time" 
(91); then, "actions," i.e., objects succeeding each other in time, are the true subjects of poetry. 
Lessing continues: "All bodies, however, exist not only in space, but also in time. They continue, 
and, at any moment of their continuance, may assume a different appearance and stand in differ-
ent relations. Every one of these momentary appearances and groupings was the result of a pre-
ceding, may become the cause of a following, and is therefore the centre of a present, action. 
Consequently painting can imitate actions also, but only as they are suggested through forms. Ac-
tions, on the other hand, cannot exist independently, but must always be joined to certain agents. 
In so far as those agents are bodies or are regarded as such, poetry describes also bodies, but on-
ly indirectly through actions" (91-92). Does Lessing tell us that the border between poetry and 
painting operates only at the level of direct representation where the signs bear a "convenient re-
lation" (91) to the thing signified, but not at the level of indirect expression? If yes, then the 
"wholly different signs" (91) that circumscribe the "proper sphere" of poetry and of painting turn 
out to be a difference of degree rather than of kind -- namely, the degree of convenience or, in 
Mitchell's terms, the "relation of relative ease or difficulty" (102). The concept of the degree of 
convenience or labour becomes more obvious when Lessing turns to the representation of bodies 
by poetry: "The details, which the eye takes in at a glance, he [the poet] enumerates slowly one 
by one. ... When we look at an object the various parts are always present to the eye. ... The ear, 
however, loses the details it has heard, unless memory retain[s] them. And if they are retained, 
what pains and effort it costs to recall their impressions in the proper order" (102). Lessing's 
choice of space and time as the property of painting and of poetry is based on what Mitchell calls 
"the economy of signs": "the difference between cheap, easy labor, and costly 'pain and effort'" 
(102). To put it another way, it is not impossible, but just more inconvenient or laborious, to allow 
poetry and painting to break the law of genre, to be "exorbitant" -- "exceeding ordinary or proper 
bounds," "encroaching" (Oxford English Dictionary): "The rule is this, that succession in time is the 
province of the poet, co-existence in space that of the artist. ... Painting and poetry should be like 
two just and friendly neighbors, neither of whom indeed is allowed to take unseemly liberties in 
the heart of the other's domain, but who exercise mutual forbearance on the borders, and effect a 
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peaceful settlement for all the petty encroachments which circumstances may compel either to 
make in haste on the rights of the other" (109-10). As Mitchell suggests: "if it is only a matter of 
degree of effort that holds poetry and painting in their proper domains, then it is clear that this 
distinction cannot be the basis for any rigorous differentiation of kind" (102). 
Nonetheless, it is hard to believe that Lessing was unaware of the tenuousness of his basis of 
the "first principles" for the poetry-painting antithesis; then, why did he still stick to policing the 
boundaries between poetry and painting? The answer may well be the "exorbitant" power of paint-
ed images that was discussed earlier. As I mentioned, painting, because of the visibility of its 
signs, is inferior to poetry in allowing free play to the imagination; by contrast, the intangibility of 
verbal images allows poetry to have an infinite range of the imagination and a wider (proper) 
sphere to enclose/encroach on the sphere of painting -- this is what Mitchell calls "an imperialist 
design" (107): But if the smaller cannot contain the greater, it can be contained in the greater 
["contain": "To keep (a hostile nation, ideology, etc.) within limits; to prevent expansion or en-
croachment into new territory" (Oxford English Dictionary)]. In other words, if not every trait em-
ployed by the descriptive poet can produce an equally good effect on canvas or in marble, can 
every trait of the artist be equally effective in the work of the poet? Undoubtedly; for what pleases 
us in a work of art pleases not the eye, but the imagination through the eye (Lessing 43). In ac-
cordance with Lessing's logic, it is tempting to come to the conclusion that we can completely dis-
pense with painting. Apparently, that is not his intention. Lessing's aim is not to radicalize the no-
tion of poetry and painting, otherwise he would not have constructed the poetry-painting border 
according to the "first principles." Lessing allows the necessity of painting by introducing certain 
kinds of advantage that poetry lacks in the representations of physical beauty: painting has "that 
power of illusion which in the presentation of visible objects art possesses above poetry" (120); "to 
make us see and feel" is "the inadequacy of all verbal expression" (134); "language of itself is 
powerless," so there are certain moments when "poetry stammers, and eloquence grows dumb," 
painting would "serve as interpreter" (135). In so doing, however, he introduces undecidability 
into his "imperialist" arguments. For the visible nature of painting, which is disdained because of 
doing violence to the imagination, now serves as a supplement, or really, a dangerous supple-
ment, to poetry: the advantage of painting empowers "the smaller" to encroach on the territory of 
poetry, "the greater." It becomes clear why Lessing makes a call to police the borders between 
poetry and painting: He establishes poetry as the proper genre, and as such, in order to prevent 
painting, the dangerous supplement, from trespassing on the property of poetry, painting needs 
careful attention: he suggests that painting be held in check by referring to the fact that the an-
cients subjected the plastic arts to "the control of civil law" (10). In this sense, I disagree with 
Allert's statement that Lessing seeks to create "equal rights among the so-called 'sister arts,' 
painting and poetry" (106). For, evidently, in Lessing's view, it is natural for "the greater" to con-
tain/encroach on "the smaller"; but it would be against natural law if "the smaller" makes an at-
tempt to encroach on "the greater": "If painting claims to be the sister of poetry, let the younger 
at least not be jealous of the elder, nor seek to deprive her of ornaments unbecoming to herself" 
(61). To put it another way, Lessing's demand for "the mutual forbearance on the borders" be-
tween poetry and painting is to preclude the expansion or encroachment of painting into the do-
main of poetry, to exclude the "exorbitant" (encroaching) painting from the property of poetry. But 
Lessing seems to forget that at the moment when he urges the painter to copy nature from poeti-
cal descriptions, he already allows painting to encroach on the domain of poetry: "The painter is 
not only to copy the same thing that the poet has copied, but he is to copy it with the same touch-
es. He is to use poet not only as narrator, but as poet" (71). In this sense, Lessing is "one who 
exceeds [the] proper limits" (Oxford English Dictionary) that he sets up; he is the exorbitant. 
In conclusion, it behoves us to say that as long as the idea of genre exists, the battle between 
poetry and painting, or broadly, between different art forms, will never end; that as long as one 
art form is given the predominant role in the battle according to a first principle on which a whole 
hierarchy of meanings relies, the logic or rhetoric of building the first principle, if scrutinised close-
ly, may always be "exorbitant," be deconstructed. Leaving the orbit of mainstream discourse on 
the battle between arts, my deconstructive readings of two earlier monographs on the poetry-
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painting relationships look closely into the very core of the notion of comparative arts -- i.e., the 
property of genre and the logic of the proper genre -- and, hopefully, will thereby draw more at-
tention to this dimension in the study of the comparison of arts. 
 
Note: I dedicate this article as a token of everlasting love to Tze-ming Hu (1972-2003). My special thanks go 
to Lyn M. Lawrence for his sincere scholarship and his help with the proofreading of my text. 
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